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The subject to be discussed in this article relates to cases
where the owner of real or personal property creates an express
trust, after the life of one specified person, to receive and apply
the rents, profits and income during the life of that person's
surviving "husband," or "wife," or "widow." Trusts thus lim-
ited have been held valid under some circumstances because the
term was necessarily measured by the life of a "person in being
at the creation of the estate," and under other circumstances
wholly invalid because the described spouse might prove to be a
-person who was not thus "in being." The particular question
here to be examined is whether, in the class of trusts found to
be invalid, it would not be possible by the insertion in the trust
instrument of a certain qualifying clause to be suggested pres-
ently, to eliminate the fatal defect while still attaining in large
degree the result desired by the creator of the trust.1 Before
stating the qualified form of provision referred to, it will be
convenient to summarize briefly the legal requirements and the
construction which the courts have given in this connection to
the terms "husband," "wife" and "widow."
In New York the permissible term of suspension of the abso-
lute power of alienation 2 and of absolute ownership 3 is restricted 4
to "two lives in being." 1 A similar two-lives restriction with
some variations in application is found in the statutes of a few
other states.6 In many jurisdictions, in varying and more or
less similar connections, the permissible number of lives is not
restricted to two. T Under either of these forms of restriction,
the question here to be discussed, or questions somewhat resem-
bling it,8 may arise. The subject will here be treated with direct
'See also infra note 8.
2 And of postponement of vesting. Matter of Wilcox, 194 N. Y. 288, 298,
300, 87 N. E. 497, 500, 501 (1909).
3 Ibid. at 306, 87 N. E. at 503.
4 Subject to an exception in the case of real property not here material.
See the statutes cited infra note 5.
5N. Y. Cons. Laws (Cahill, 1923) c. 51, §§ 42, 64; 1 N. Y. Rev. Stat.
(1829) 723, §§ 14, 15; ibid. 726, § 41; N. Y. Cons. Laws (Cahill, 1923)
c. 42, § 11; 1 N. Y. Rev. Stat. (1829) 773-774, §§ 1-4. See supra note 4.
62 Mich. Comp. Laws (1915) §§ 11532-11534; Minn. Gen. Stat. (1923)
§§ 8044-8046; Wis. Stat. (1921) §§ 2038-2040.
7 GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUrTIES (3d ed. 1915) §§ 214, 216; MARSDEN,
RuLm AGAINST PERPETUITIES (1883) 32.
8 For example, in the "lives-in-being" jurisdictions, the question of the
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reference to the restriction to "two lives in being," and in con-
nection with that form of suspension of alienability of real
property or of absolute ownership of personal property which
is occasioned 9 by express trusts to receive and apply rents, profits
and income to the use of individual beneficiaries.
The persons whose lives are thus to furnish the measure of
the trust term must be desigwted in the instrument. For ex-
ample, it is not sufficient merely to use the words "two lives in
being," or the words "during the time prescribed by the statute
governing perpetuities." The statute prescribes no time. It re-
quires the creator of the trust to designate two particular per-
sons. It does not expressly speak of "designated" lives, but that
requirement is necessarily implied. ' The purpose of requiring
such a designation is to furnish a definite measure of the term.
If no particular persons were designated, no one could ever tell
when the term had ended. And the persons designated must be
"persons in being at the time of the creation of the trust." 11 As
applied to our case of a future trust to continue during the life
of a person designated in the instrument as the surviving "hus-
band," or "wife," or "widow" of a specified individual, if the
descriptive word is such in a given case that one answering to
it might possibly prove, at the end of the "first life," to be a
person who had not been thus "in being," the designation is
fatally defective, even as applied to a surviving spouse who was
in fact in being at the creation of the estate. -2 "To render such
validity of a gift limited to vest only upon the death of "the widow" of a
specified person. GRAY, op. cit. svpra note 7, § 214. In such cases, while
it is of no consequence whether the designated lives exceed two in number,
the courts are called upon to decide, exactly as in the "two-lives-in-being"
jurisdictions, whether the lives that are designated are those of perzons "in
being," which is the very question presented in given instances by the use
of the words "husband," "wife," or "idow." Accordingly, cases from
"lives-in-being" jurisdictions are cited infra in many of the footnotes.
ON. Y. Cons. Laws (Cahill, 1923) c. 51, §§ 103, 105; 1 N. Y. Rev. Stat.
(1829) 730, §§ 63, 65. Stringer v. Young, 191 N. Y. 157, 164, 165, 83 N. E.
690, 692, 693 (1908) (personal property).
10 Woodgate v. Fleet, 64 N. Y. 566, 571 (1876); Matter of Fisher, s. c.
sub nom. Matter of Mead, 2 Connelly's Surr. 75, 8 N. Y. Supp. 10 (1839);
Simpson v. Cook, 24 Alinn. 180 (1877). As to "lives in being" and remote-
ness, see GRAY, op. cit. supra note 7, at § 219a; Port-man v. Viscount
Portman [1922] 2 A. C. 473; infra notes 13, 20, 23, 42, 47. As to a desig-
nation made by the donee of a power, see the cases cited infra note 09.
As to the scope of the term "designated" see infra notes 32-34.
11 Woodgate v. Fleet, supra note 10, at 571; Matter of Chittick, 243 N. Y.
304, 153 N. E. 83 (1926).
12 The case under discussion is to be distinguished from cases where
certain provisions may be sustained as valid in spite of the presence of
other and separable provisions which are invalid. Matter of Trevor, 2'J9
N. Y. 6, 17, 145 N. E. 66, 69 (1924) ; Matter of Wilcox, supra note 2, at 294,
87 N. E. at 499; Matter of Mlount, 185 N. Y. 162, 168, '77 N. E. 999, 1001
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future estates valid, they must be so limited that in every pos-
sible contingency they will absolutely terminate," by the end of
two designated lives in being. 13
Thus in Schettler v. Smith, 4 John M. Smith in 1858 made his
last will and testament. One share of his estate he devised and
bequeathed in trust to receive the rents and income, and pay
them to his son John Jacob Smith during life, and then to John
Jacob's "wife" during her life. The testator died in January,
1861, and his son John Jacob died in October of the same year
having never been married. In an action brought for the con-
struction of the will, the question of the validity of the provision
for John Jacob's "wife" was discussed in the opinion of Judge
Grover in the results of which a majority of the court concurred.
He says: "Now, it is clear, that the son might have married a
woman born after the death of the testator, . . . and that
such woman might have survived the son; and in the happening
of such events, the trust to pay the income to such woman, during
her life, would not have terminated upon the death of two per-
sons in being at the death of the testator; consequently the pro-
vision . . might" cause a suspension of alienability for a
term not duly measured, and was invalid.15 So much for the
case of a future trust after one life, the term of which is to be
measured by the life of the surviving "wife" of an unmarried
man.
By the same will, the testator devised and bequeathed another
share of his estate upon similar trusts for the benefit of his son
Lawrence S. Smith during life, and then for the benefit of the
"wife" of Lawrence during her life. At the date of the will,
Lawrence was married, and he and his wife were both living at
the death of the testator. The opinion states that if the testator
intended to confine his designation to the then living wife of
Lawrence, the trust would be valid. The effect would be the same
(1906).; Purdy v. Hayt, 92 N. Y. 446, 456 (1883); Schettler v. Smith, 41
N. Y. 328, 336 (1869). As to provisions not thus separable, see Matter of
Homer, 237 N. Y. 489, 502, 143 N. E. 655, 659 (1924).
13 Schettler v. Smith, supra note 12, at 334, 335; Hawley v. James, 16
Wend. 61 (N. Y. 1836); Amory v. Lord, 9 N. Y. 403, 418, 419 (1853);
Matter of Hitchcock, 222 N. Y. 57, 71, 118 N. E. 220, 223 (1917) ; Matter
of Mount, supra note 12, at 169, 77 N. E. at 1001. As to "lives in being" and
remoteness, see Gray v. Whittemore, 192 Mass. 367, 78 N. E. 422 (1906);
Ledwith v. Hurst, 284 Pa. 94, 130 Atl. 315 (1925); Ward v. Van der Loeff
[1924] A. C. 653, 677-679; LEwis, PERPEuiTY (1843) 170; see supra note
10 and infra notes 20, 23, 42, 47.
14 Supra note 12..
15 Schettler v. Smith, supra note 12, at 335, 336. See also the opinion of
Judge Daniels, ibid. at 343; Tiers v. Tiers, 98 N. Y. 568, 573, 574 (1885);
Hayden v. Sugden, 48 Misc. 108, 117, 96 N. Y. Supp. 681, 687 (Sup. Ct.
1905).
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as if he had identified her by name.10 "Ordinarily the use of the
word 'wife' in a will means the person who, at the date thereof,
is the wife of the man named. An existing fact is referred to." 17
Thus we have the rule of construction to be followed in the case
of a future trust after one life, the term of which is to be meas-
ured by the life of one described merely as the "wife" of a
married man.
But in the case of the trust for the "wife" of Lawrence S.
Smith, the designation of the second life was not left in that
simple form. In other parts of the will the surviving spouse
was referred to as Lawrence's "widow," which word standing
alone would mean "any surviving wife," and the court found
that it was in this sense that the testator had used the word
"wife." The trust was therefore invalid.'0  "The use of the
word 'widow' . . . involves no fact in existence at the date
of the will." 19 "It is difficult to formulate a general rule on the
subject, for 'no will has a brother,' and the language of every
testator must be studied by itself in order to learn his inten-
tion." 20
The use of the words "a" wife, or "a" husband, would also
ordinarily mean "any" wife or husband, but this presumption
may be controlled by other expressions of the instrument indi-
cating an intent to refer to an existing spouse.21
16 Schettler v. Smith, supra note 12, at 348, 349.
17 Ieeker v. Draffen, 201 N. Y. 205, 209, 94 N. E. 620, 62S (1911). See
also Kiah v. Grenier, 1 T. & C. 338 (Sup. Ct. 1873), aff'd 56 N. Y. 220
(1874).
3S Schettler v. Smith, supra note 12, at 348, :349; Tiers v. Tiers, -zip a
note 15, at 573, 574; Stevens v. Miller, 2 Dem. 597 (N. Y. Surr. 1834);
Lee v. Lee, 2 How. Prac. (N. S.) 76 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1883); Wright v.
Mlercein, 34 Misc. 414, 69 N. Y. Supp. 936 (Sup. CL 1901). But in given
cases, a reference to both "wife" and "widow" may evidently mean the
e:dsting wife. Davis v. Kerr, 3 App. Div. 322, 33 N. Y. Supp. "S7 (1896);
Allen v. Allen, 149 N. Y. 280, 43 N. E. 626 (1S96); Beers v. Narramore,
61 Conn. 13, 22 Atl. 1061 (1891); In re Coley [1903] 2 Ch. 102.
19 Meeker v. Draffen, supra note 17, at 209, 94 N. E. at 623; Van Brunt v.
Van Brunt, 111 N. Y. 178, 19 N. E. 60 (1388); Swallow v. Swallow's Adm'r,
27 N. 3. Eq. 278 (1876). As to the effect of divorce, see Matter of Ensign,
103 N. Y. 284, 8 N. E. 544 (1886); Metropolitan Trust Co. v. Bishop, 206
App. Div. 164, 200 N. Y. Supp. 649 (1923), aFfd 237 N. Y. 607, 143 N. E.
762 (1924).
20 Ieeker v. Draffen, supra note 17, at 209, 94 N. E. at 623. See also
In re Hardyman [1925] Ch. 287; In re Allott [1924] 2 Ch. 493; In re
Bullock's Will Trusts [1915] 1 Ch. 493; In re Garnham [1916] 2 Ch. 413;
In re Coley, supra note 18; In re Hancock [1896] 2 Ch. 17:3; In re Drew
[1899] 1 Ch. 336; the opinions in which discuss Garratt v. Niblocl:, 1 Russ.
& Myl. 629 (Ch. 1830) ; In re Lyne's Trust, L. R. 8 Eq. G5 (1809) ; Boreham
v. Bignall, 8 Hare, 131 (Ch. 1850) and other cases cited supra notes 10,
13 and infra notes 23, 39, 42, 47.
21 Van Brunt v. Van Brunt, supra note 19.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
The adoption as a general guide of the distinction, in the case
of a married man, between the terms "his wife" and "his widow,"
calls attention to one of the difficulties the courts must often
encounter, arising out of the eccentricities of language. Such a
distinction, if adopted at all, ought naturally to apply equally to
the spouse of a married man and the spouse of a married woman.
But here enters upon the scene one of the eccentricities men-
tioned. If the instrument refers merely to the "wife" of a
married man, it is reasonable to infer an exclusive reference to
the existing wife, and if it refers merely to a man's "widow,"
it is reasonable to infer a reference to any person who may
prove to be his surviving wife. The creator of the trust has a
choice of two words which suggest two different intents, and he
chooses one or the other, and from the fact of his selection the
court may infer his intent. But now suppose that the sexes are,
so to speak, shuffled, and that he wishes to refer on the one
hand to the existing husband, or on the other hand to "any"
husband who may survive a married woman, and sees fit, as
often happens, to use only one word for that purpose. The
choice which he had before between two words to indicate which
was his intent does not now exist. If he uses the word "hus-
band," the courts cannot say with the same force of reason as
in the case of the word "wife," that "husband" presumably
means the existing husband, for husband is the only word there
is to indicate either intent. Even if he intended thus to refer
to any surviving husband whatever, he could not be expected to
speak, for example, of his then living daughter's "widower." It
happens that the word widower is not in as common use in that
connection as is the word widow. 22 Nevertheless, as a practical
matter, it would appear very possible that the courts may apply
the same rule of construction to the word "husband" which they
have adopted in the case of the word "wife." 23 However that
22 It is true that if he wished to do something fantastic he might say
"my daughter's 'relict.'" See Spitler v. Heeter, 42 Ohio St. 100 (1884).
But even in the sense of "widow," the word is now only occasionally resur-
rected for use in obituary notices or on tombstones to describe the widow
of a man who was, it seems to suggest, so exalted a personage that his
surviving wife should be mentioned by no means as a mere ordinary widow,
but as a "relict." It is now "archaic or humorous, except in law." Standard
Dictionary.
23 The presumption would apply only in the absence of controlling indi-
cations of a contrary intent. Meeker v. Draffen, supra note 17. A simple
rule of construction of that character, based on reasons which would usually
be sound, may attain better results than a confused multitude of special
rules. Some distinctions, though in a sense "logical," as perhaps this dis-
tinction between "husband" and wife," may be so refined that to recognize
them would merely be following logic out of the window. "After all, there
is such a thing as common sense." In re Hancock, supra note 20. The
cases, however, which hold that "husband," in given instances, means the
FUTURE TRUSTS
may be, we can at least say this: that if there be both married
men and married women in question, and the creator of the trust
elects in the case of the men to refer merely to "their wives,"
thus designating their present wives, his use of the term "their
husbands" in the case of the women may naturally be construed,
as was done in the Van Brint case,24 as referring likewise to
the existing husbands.
For its bearing on what is to follow, it is now important to
recall that in the case of a will it is not the date of execution,
but that of the testator's death, that marks "the creation of the
estate," and thus the time when the "two lives" must be "in
being." 25 From this it follows that it is not essential to the
validity of a testamentar designation of the "second life" that
the "husband" or "wife" referred to should be such, or even be
living, at the date of execution of the will. It is enough if the
designation is confined to "such person as shall, at the testator's
death, be then the husband or wife in question." For exmnple,
in the case of the trust for John Jacob Smith -1 who was un-
married when the will was made, and where a trust after his
death for the life of his "wife" would be invalid, there can be
no doubt that if the testator had designated "any woman who
shall be his wife at my death, and shall survive him," the trust
for the life of such a wife, had she existed, would have been
valid. The intent to confine the designation to a person "in being
at the creation of the estate" would have been expressly set
forth.2
7
Thus if a testator having three children should provide for
one trust to receive and apply rents throughout the lives of "all
such children of mine, now living or hereafter born, as shall
survive me," and the testator should then die, the term would
be measured by three lives, and the trust under the "two lives"
rule would be invalid; but if during his life one of his children
should die and he left only two surviving, the term would be
measured by their two lives, and the trust would be valid. So if,
at the execution of that will he had only two children, the trust
would be valid if he were then to die; but if during his life a
third child were born and the three survived, it would be in-
existing husband, show a tendency to refer for support to special facts and
expressions. See Franks v. Brooker, 27 Beav. 635 (Ch. 1860); In Matter
of Bryan's Trust, 2 Sim. (N. S.) 103 (Ch. 1851); Van Brunt v. Van Brunt,
supra note 19, at 186, 19 N. E. at 62; cases cited supra note 20.
24Supra note 19.
25 See the statutes cited supra note 5.
26 Schettler v. Smith, supra note 12.
27 Sears v. Russell, 8 Gray, 86, 98 (lass. 1857). The intention of the
creator of a trust means his intention as indicated in the instrument. But
what he thus intends may relate either to facts then e.xisting, or to such
as may exist at a later time specified, as for example, in a will, at the
YALE LAW JOURNAL
valid.28  So a testator may designate as a "life" such one of his
own children, or of some other person, whether then living or
thereafter born, "as may at the time of my death be the youngest
of said children"; and the life of such youngest, though born
after the execution of the will, constitutes a validly designated
life.2 9 It therefore follows that a testator may validly designate
as a "second life" "such person as may, at the time of my death,
be the husband (or wife) of" a specified individual.
And now, advancing a step further, is there any way in which
the creator of a trust may in any case validly designate as a
"second life" a husband or wife who may become such after the
testator's death, or after the delivery of the trust deed? He
evidently could do so, for example, by naming a then living
woman, and providing that in case she should at any time there-
after become the wife of an individual specified, the trust should
continue after the first life for her benefit during her life. But
the present question is whether the creator of the trust could in
any way validly designate as the second life "such person [not
personally identified by name] as may hereafter at any time
during said 'first life' become the spouse" of a specified person.
John M. Smith, for example, 30 desired and attempted.to desig-
death of the testator. Meeker v. Draffen, supra note 17, 208, 209, 94
N. E. at 628; McLean v. Freeman, 70 N. Y. 81, 87 (1877); Matter of
Thompson, 217 N. Y. 111, 115, 111 N. E. 762, 763 (1916); Matter of Gaff-
ken, 197 App. Div. 257, 188 N. Y. Supp. 852 (1921), aff'd 233 N. Y. 688, 135
N. E. 971 (1922). As to a deed signed on one date with a view to delivery
later, and dealing with facts as they may exist with reference to the date of
delivery, see the New York statutes cited supra note 5; Van Cott v.
Prentice, 104 N. Y. 45, 10 N. E. 257 (1887); Portman v. Viscount Portman,
supra note 10; cf. FARWELL, POWERS (1874) 226.
28 Griffin v. Ford, 1 Bosw. 123, 137 (N. Y. Super. Ct. 1857); Lang v.
Ropke, 5 Sandf. 363 (N. Y. Super. Ct. 1852); Lang v. Wilbraham, 2 Duer,
171 (N. Y. Super. Ct. 1853); DuBois v. Ray, 7 Bosw. 244, 300 (N. Y.
Super. Ct. 1860) ; Butler v. Butler, 3 Barb. Ch. 304, 311 (N. Y. Ch. 1848) ;
Galway v. Brice, 10 Misc. 255, 257, 30 N. Y. Supp. 985 (Sup. Ct. 1894);
McArthur v. Scott, 113 U. S. 340, 382, 5 Sup. Ct. 652 (1885); Dungannon
v. Smith, 12 Cl. & F. 546 (H. L. 1845); Southern v. Wollaston, 16 Beav.
276 (Ch. 1852); FARWELL, op. cit. supra note 27, at 226; LEWxS, op. cit.
supra note 13, at 27, and its supplement (1849) 53, 57; MARSDEN, op. Cit.
supra note 7, at 67; GRAY, op. cit. supra note 7, § 231. In Odell v. Youngs,
64 How. Prac. 56 (N. Y. Com. P1. 1882) the judge before whom the case was
tried held that Griffen v. Ford, supra, and Lang v. Ropke, supra, had been
overruled on this point. In this he was mistaken, and his statement of the
law is not correct. See Judge McAdam's review of the subject in Tallman
v. Tallman, 3 Misc. 465, 23 N. Y. Supp. 734 (Sup. Ct. 1893) and the cases
cited infra note 29.
29Jacoby v. Jacoby, 188 N. Y. 124, 131, 80 N. E. 676, 678 (1907); Cogan
v. McCabe, 23 Misc. 739, 52 N. Y. Supp. 48 (Sup. Ct. 1898) and cases there
cited; Simpson v. Cook, supra note 10; Sears v. Russell, supra note 27
("any husband of my daughter, living at my death"); infra note 47.
3o Schettler v. Smith, supra note 12.
FUTURE TRUSTS
nate "any such wife" as his son John Jacob, then unmarried,
might thereafter marry and leave surviving. That provision
was invalid. But it is believed that there is a form of description
which the testator could have employed which, in case John
Jacob had married, even after his father's death, and had left a
wife surviving, would have rendered the trust valid under some
(and those the most probable) circumstances. For now suppose
that John A. Smith, while retaining the provision for John
Jacob's "wife," had eliminated the "possibility" that caused the
invalidity. This he could have done by defining the term "wife"
so as expressly to exclude any person not living at the testator's
death, and to include any wife whatsoever whom John Jacob
might at any time marry, if in fact she should be a person who
was living when the will took effect31 This form of description
represents the suggested clause heretofore referred to. It might,
for example, read thus: "And from the death of my son John
Jacob, to receive and apply the rents and income to the use and
during the life of any wife whom he may at any time marry
and leave surviving, amd who shall be a person who was in ex-
istence at the time of my death." Against such a designation
the sole objection already mentioned would find no ground for
its support.
If, then, John Jacob had later married a women born after
the testator's death, she would simply not answer to the de-
scription in the will. No trust for her would have been attempted.
But if under the proposed provision John Jacob had later mar-
ried, and left surviving a person who was living at the testator's
death, the trust for her would then have been saved by virtue
of that provision. Without this form of description the law
would be compelled to assume that Johm Jacob might possibly,
after biding his time for a couple of decades or so, marry a
woman born subsequent to the death of the testator. In fact
he died nine months after the testator. If in the interval he
had married, his wife would necessarily have been a person in
being at the creation of the estate. He could not have married
a person nine months old. But the courts would still, in that
event, have been obliged to test the validity of the term, not by
what had happened, but by what might possibly have happened.
The trust for the wife, though in fact a person eligible for
designation as the "second life," would have been invalid. Yet
if, in the event of such a marriage during the nine months, the
suggested clause had been in the will, it would, by spiking the
unlawful "possibility," have saved the trust for the wife.
So in the case of the trust after the death of Lawrence S.
3' See the statutes cited supra note 5 for the definition of the term
"creation of the estate"; and see supra note 27.
343
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Smith, the testator's married son,3 2 for any wife he might leave
surviving. His wife, Ann Eliza, who was his wife at the date
of the will in 1858 and at the testator's death in 1861, was still
living when the construction of the will was before the court in
1869. But the trust was held invalid because as viewed from
the time when the will took effect (1) she might die before Law-
rence and (2) he might marry again and (3) his substituted
bride might have been born after January, 1861, and (4) she or
some other and equally disqualified woman might be his wife at
the time of his death. And yet, if the suggested clause had been
in the will, and if his wife Ann Eliza or any later wife born
before the testator's death should survive him, the trust for the
"second life" would have been saved. Or such, at least, would be
the result unless that clause is subject to some legal objection
or qualification not yet considered.
Does the description given in the proposed clause constitute
what is meant by the requirement that the second life must be
"designated"? The proposed form, it might first be objected,
does not designate the person by name. But such an identifica-
tion is not required. Thus the designation of the "wife" of a
married man is just as definite as though her name had been
inserted.33 So the designation of "such child of mine as shall, at
the time of my death, be the youngest of my children," is
adequate. 34
Another objection might be that under the suggested form, and
until the termination of the "first life," the personal identity of
the person designated to represent the "second life" would con-
tinue unknown. But it is not necessary that the identity of
that person should be known during the pendency of the first
life, either to the trustee or to the beneficiary or to the creator
of the trust if, as in the case of a trust created by deed, he is
still living or should even be capable of discovery until the first
life ends. Thus a grantor created a trust to pay the income of
property to Mrs. Howland and her three daughters, who were
living at the creation of the trust, during the life of the grantor
(which thus constituted the "first life"). He further provided
that at his death the principal should be disposed of in accord-
ance with sealed instructions delivered with the deed but not
to be opened until the grantors death. During the life of the
grantor, he was the only one who knew what the instructions
contained. When, at his death, the sealed paper was opened, it
was found to continue the trust for the same beneficiaries until
the majority of such one of the three daughters (persons in
82 Schettler v. Smith, supra note 12.





being at the delivery of the deed) as should, at the death of the
grantor, be the youngest of them then living. The life of such
youngest survivor constituted the "second life." During the
grantor's life, even he did not know which of the three daughters
might prove to be the particular one by whose minority the
second portion of the trust term would be measured. The
designation was sustained as vafid.3
And in Schennerhorn v. Cottbzg, 31 Amos Cotting created testa-
mentary trusts for the benefit of his wife, his son and his
daughter. During the lifetime of the wife, the income was to be
divided into three parts, and one part was to be paid to each
of the three beneficiaries. Thus the life of the wife constituted
the first life. At the termination of this first life, the whole
estate was to be divided into two equal and independent trusts,
one in favor of the son and the other in favor of the daughter.
As to each of these shares, the life of the respective child con-
stituted the second life. But it occurred to the testator that he
should make special provision for the event that one of the chil-
dren might die during the first life. He accordingly provided
that in that case, and upon the death of his wife, the entire
income should then be paid to the son (if he was the sole sur-
vivor) during his life, and if the daughter was the sole sur-
vivor, then the entire income was to be paid to her during her
life. The court said:
"It has appeared that in the contingency of the death of the
son before the wife, the trust term was limited by the lives of
the wife and daughter, while upon the other contingency, viz.,
the death of the wife before the son, the trust in the one-half
of the estate was limited by the lives of the wife and son,
The two lives which govern the duration of the trust in one con-
tingency are not the same two lives which govern its duration
in the other. Does this circumstance render the trust void? I
do not see why it should. . . . The wife is the one person
whose life is counted in both contingencies, and in the one the
daughter is added and in the other the son; but one or the other
of the two contingencies must happen, and in no event is the
trust to endure longer than two selected lives in being at its
creation. Such a provision does not run counter to the vievs
upon which our statute against perpetuities is based.
Where a trust is created which by no possibility and in no con-
tingency can endure longer than during the eistence of tw~o
lives in being, of what consequence can it be that if one con-
tingency happen, the estate is to be measured by tvo named
lives, and that if the other contingency happen, the estate is
still to be measured by two named lives, but one of them is
different from the one named in the other contingency? So long
as both contingencies cannot happen, the number of lives upon
whose duration the trust term is to be limited cannot be more
than two actually named and in existence when the trust was
35 Van Cott v. Prentice, supra note 27, at 57.
36131 N. Y. 48, 29 N. E. 980 (1892).
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created. . . So long as the trust can last but two lives,
which two shall be the selected ones may be left to the happen-
ing of a contingency such as exists in this case." 87
In such a case there is at no time during the entire term any
uncertainty about the identity of the particular life "in being"
on which its continuance is then depending."
The doctrine of these cases thus appears to be decisive in
favor of such a form of designation as has here been suggested,
unless one distinction now to be mentioned interferes with that
result. For in the cases just examined, the "second life,"
though not itself specifically identifiable at the creation of the
estate, was at any rate described as being that of one or another,
as the facts might turn out by the end of the "first life," of
certain individuals each one of whom was personally identified
in the instrument. And in the foregoing quotation from the
Schermerhom case, the court, in speaking of the will before it,
says that "the number of lives upon whose duration the trust
term is to be limited cannot [under that will] be more than two
actually named and in existence when the trust was created."
But in our suggested clause on the contrary, there is no such
limited group of identified persons, some one of whom, by the
end of the "first life," must, if the trust is then to continue,
become known as the particular "second life." If any "group"
is to be found in it, it consists, in effect, of all the men or women
in existence at the creation of the estate. For, as a matter of
legal theory, any woman in all the world might be, or become,
eligible to marry the specified man and might be persuaded by
him to do so; or any man in all the world might prove to be the
surviving husband of the specified woman. Accordingly, the
question arises whether the presence of a group of specifically
identified eligibles constituted a controlling reason for the de-
cisions rendered, or was merely an accidental and unessential
circumstance which happened to exist in those cases. Now the
statutes say nothing about any group of eligibles. Nor is there
any "general policy" of the law from which any such require-
ment 'could be derived.39 Furthermore, there is a practical
difficulty which stands in the way of acceding to the necessity
of naming such a group.
37 Ibid. at 62, 63, 29 N. E. at 982, 983.
38 For illustrations of invalidity due to uncertainty, see Brown v. Evans,
34 Barb. 594 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1861); Bean v. Hockman, 31 Barb. 78 (N. Y.
Sup. Ct. 1859).
39 Thus under the New York law of powers, the beneficiary of a trust fox
his life may be empowered to designate by his will a further life during
which the suspension shall continue. He may thus, for example, designate
his wife if she is a person in being at the creation of the power. It is
not necessary to provide him with a list of eligibles. Hillen v. Iselin, 144
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For what, in that connection, would be the meaning of the
word "group"? Just how many people might validly be included
in it? In naming a group of eligibles from whom the "wife"
must be selected, would it do to name ten women, or a hundred,
or a thousand, or all female descendants of any person who
came over in the Mlayflower, or of any person who had been
listed in Who's Who in America? Where could the line be
drawn? And if it were said that the test must be found in
the ease and certainty with which membership in the group
might be ascertained, that difficulty would at once disappear by
enlarging the group still further to consist of all existing de-
scendants of Adam and Eve, or, in other words, as in our pro-
posed clause, "any surviving wife or husband who shall have been
in being at the creation of the estate."4 1 In short, any limited-
group theory would be hopelessly vague and impractical. Under
the proposed clause, when the time comes to identify the person,
that person, if there is ever to be one answering to the descrip-
tion given, will at once be known. At the death of the specified
man, for example, the terms "any surviving wife," or "the
widow," could not refer to more than one person, as in the case
of a certain Ann Eliza, or Frances, or Nellie, or Florence, or
Jennie.4 No matter how industrious and efficient the man
N, Y. 365, 378, 39 N. E. 368, 372 (1895); Crooke v. County of Kings,
97 N. Y. 421 (1884); Maitland v. Baldwin, 70 Hun, 2G7, 270, 24 N. Y.
Supp. 29, 31 (Sup. Ct. 1893).
The same holds true in limiting a remainder after an estate for one life
or two lives to such person as shall, when the time for vesting arrives,
answer to a given description. Meeker v. Draffen, supra note 17, at 209,
94 N. E. at 628; Course v. Chapman, 153 N. Y. 466, 47 N. E. 812 (1897) ;
Kelso v. Lorillard, 85 N. Y. 177 (iSS1); Mead v. Mitchell, 17 X. Y. 210
(1858); see also In re Bullock's Will Trusts, supra note 20, and In re Garn-
ham, supra- note 20.
The cases in this note, which obviously differ in many respects from the
case under consideration, are here cited merely on the question of the ex-
istence of any "general policy" requiring the designation of a group of
eligibles. Those relating to powers, however, would appear to lend direct
support to the form here suggested. See GRAY, op. cit. supt note 7, § 517,
et seq.
4 0 Any requirement, in jurisdictions where a term is measured by lives,"
instead of "two lives," that the number must be so limited that the ex-
piration of the term may be definitely ascertained (GrAtY, op. cit. anpra
note 7, § 217; MARSDEN, op. cit. supra note 7, at 32; Fitchie v. Brown, s.p;a
note 33) has no bearing where a second life is to be ascertained at the
expiration of one life specified.
41 See Schettler v. Smith, stipra note 12; Meeker v. Draffen, sp-ra note
17; Durfee v. Pomeroy, 154 N. Y. 583, 49 N. E. 132 (1898); Matter of
Harris, 152 App. Div. 52, 136 N. Y. Supp. 711 (1912), aff'd 206 N. Y. 690,
99 N. E. 1108 (1912) ; Williams v. Alt, 226 N. Y. 283, 123 N. E. 499 (1919).
In addition to future trusts for a surviving spouse, we have those where
there is a gift to the spouse, or to others upon the death of that spouse.
Sears v. Russell, supra note 27; Swallow v. Swallow's Adm'r, slipna note 19;
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might be in negotiating successive matrimonial alliances, and
even though at his death there should appear a galaxy of com-
peting alleged widows, their claims could not affect the validity
of the trust instrument, and there would be no legally insoluble
problem in identifying the one, if any, who answered to the
description given. And to determine whether the surviving
spouse so identified is, as specified in the instrument, a person
who was "in being" at the creation of the estate, would present
no more difficulty than in any case where, after the lapse of
years, a date of birth must be ascertained.
Many other methods of qualifying and thus rendering valid
what would otherwise have constituted illegal measures of the
term are found in the reports, and lend full support, in reason,
to the form under discussion. Thus, as illustrations, we have
the following: A trust after A's life for the life of a person
described merely as his "widow" is invalid. But if the designa-
tion were confined to his existing wife it would be valid.42 So
a trust after A's life for the life of a specified daughter, in being
at the creation of the estate, is valid.43  So if a testator leaves
three or more children surviving him, a trust in his will to
continue until the youngest of them to reach majority shall do
so, is, under the "two lives" rule, not duly measured; but if the
designation is confined to the one who is the youngest at the
testator's death, it is duly measured. 44 So if a testator creates
after one life, a separate trust for the life of each of several
persons living at his death, and for the life of each of several
persons who might thereafter be born, the former might be sus-
cases cited above in this note. Such cases may or may not involve sus-
pension of alienability or remoteness, but they all present the same question
arising in the trist cases of determining who was meant by the designa-
tions "husband," or "wife," or "widow." See infra notes 42, 47.
42Supra notes 16-19. So with the necessity that remainders, to be valid,
must be so limited that they will certainly vest, if ever, by the end of the
prescribed period. A gift to vest only upon the death of the "widow" of
the testator's son is invalid; but if the will adds: "or at the death of my
son, if he leaves no widow," the latter gift is valid. Schettler v. Smith,
supra note 12, at 336-339; see also Kiah v. Grenier, supra note 17, 56 N. Y.
at 225; Matter of Wilcox, supra note 2; In re Bullock's Will Trusts, supra
note 20; GRAY, op. cit. supra note 7, §§ 247, 332; MARSDEN, op. Cit. supra
note '7, at 103; In re Harvey, L. R. 39 Ch. D. 289 (1888) ("any husband");
Tiers v. Tiers, supra note 15 ("any widow") ; Matter of Homer, supra note
12, at 496; Tichenor v. Mechanics' Nat'l Bank, 96 N. J. Eq. 560, 125 Atl,
323 (1924);'Overby v. Scarborough, 145 Ga. 875, 90 S. E. 67 (1916);
Shewmake v. Robinson, 148 Ga. 287, 96 S. E. 564 (1918); Sears v. Russell,
supra note 27 ("any surviving husband," "any present or future husband") ;
Gray v. Whittemore, supra note 13; In re Allott, supra note 20 ("the sur-
viving husband, if any").
43 Manice v. Manice, 43 N. Y. 303, 385 (1871).
44 Jacoby v. Jacoby, supra note 29, at 130, 131, 80 N. E. 677, 678;
Van Cott v. Prentice, supra note 27, at 57, 10 N. E. at 262.
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tained, while the latter are invalid.45 Many other illustrations
might be added. The proposed clause follows the same lines by
merely eliminating the possibility of illegality. If in its case the
same conclusion of validity were not to follow, the result would
constitute nothing less than a legalistic nightmare.40
Indeed, the proposed method of saving trusts which would by
themselves be valid from contamination by others that are
invalid is so simple, and its validity and efficiency are so clear,
that this detailed discussion might call for an apology, vere it
not for the fact, so far as concerns the trust instruments dealt
with in the reports, that such an antiseptic provision appears
almost never to have been resorted to,47 and that attempted
trusts, for the lack of it, have actually gone down in the general
ruin. As applied to future trusts of the class here in question,
the results of the discussion may now be briefly summarized.
Subject to variation by special indications of intent, these
results are as follows:
(1) Invalid designations of the "second life" are, for example,
those found in the mere term "the wife" of a man then un-
married;4S or "the widow," -5 or "any" husband, or wife,: 9 of
a person then either married or unmarried. The reason for the
invalidity is that a surviving spouse thus described might pos-
45 Matter of Mount, supra note 12, at 168-170,77 N. E. at 1001, 1002. See
Matter of Homer, supra note 12, at 503, 143 N. E. at 060; Matter of Trevor,
supra note 12.
46 For an instance of the actual use in a will of the form here under
discussion, see infra note 47.
47 One instance of a testator's use, in substance, of this form has been
found in the reports. In Metropolitan Trust Co. v. Bishop, -upra note 19,
at 165, 200 N. Y. Supp. at 650, the will, after creating a trust for each
of the testator's children, used these words: "In case of the death of any
one of my sons leaving him urviving a wife born before my death, to
pay one-third of the income of the said share to said wife quarterly as
long as she shall live, . . ." See also Portman v. Viscount Portman,
supra note 10, at 491.
In Sears v. Russell, supra note 27, there was a devise to vest only upon the
death of "any present or future husband" of the testator's daughter. This
was held void for remoteness, but the court said that it would have been
valid if it had been limited upon the death of "any husband of my daughter,
living at my death." These words may, however, mean nothing more than
"any husband who shall have been such at my death."
To the effect that a devise in terms similar to those in the will last
referred to would have been valid if limited to vest absolutely at the death
of one specified person in being, with a mere postponement of pozzezsion
during the life of "any widow" of the specified person, see Klingman v.
Gilbert, 90 Kan. 545, 135 Pac. 682 (1913). Cf. In re Bullock's Will Trusts,
supra note 20; In re Garnham, supra note 20.
4s Supra notes 14, 15.
49 Supra notes 18, 19.
5 Supra notes 15, 18.
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sibly prove to be a person who was not in being at the creation
of the estate.
(2) Valid designations of the "second life" are, for example,
those found in the mere term "the wife" of a man then married 11
(and also, very possibly, by analogy, "the husband" of a woman
'then married)52 and, in a will, "any person who" at the testator's
death, shall then be the husband, or wife, of one either married
or unmarried at the date of the will.5 3  The reason for the
validity is that a surviving spouse thus described will certainly
be a person who was in being at the creation of the estate.
(3) Where a designation of the "second life" would other-
wise be broad enough to include "any" spouse who might become
such after the creation of the estate, and would thus fall into
the invalid class, yet if the instrument 4 should restrict the desig-
nation to "any such" surviving husband, or wife, or widow, as
should in fact prove to be a person who was in being at the
creation of the estate, the case would thereby be withdrawn from
the invalid class because the reason for inclusion therein would
be absent, and would pass over into the valid class because the
reason for inclusion therein would be present. While that re-
strictive form cannot and does not seek to protect (because the
law forbids) a trust after one life for the further life of a spouse
who proves to have been not thus "in being," it would be effective
(as the other forms of expression dealt with in the reports were
not) to scotch the "mere possibility" doctrine, and thus to save
the trust for any surviving spouse who does in fact prove to
have been thus "in being." r5
51 Supra notes 16, 17.
52 Supra notes 22-24.
53Supra notes 25-29. As to a deed, see supra note 27.
- Whether will or deed, see supra note 31.
55 And also to save a remainder limited to vest upon the expiration of the
second life thus designated. See Sears v. Russell, supra note 27; and
supra notes 41, 42, 47.
